With a framework based on interests, interactions and institutions, World Politics gives students an accessible analytical approach to understand international relations. In the Fifth Edition, two new guest contributors-Stephanie Rickard and Susan Hyde-offer cutting-edge analysis of current issues, including the global coronavirus pandemic and trade war between the United States and China. When assigned with InQuizitive and brand new News Analysis activities, students can apply the framework to global and current events.

The political economy of international trade and trade policy - at both the domestic and international levels - has spawned a vast literature from both economists and political scientists. This two volume set includes seminal contributions to our understanding of international trade among the advanced industrial countries, between them and the lesser developed countries and between East and West. It includes work on the political economy of trade liberalization, protectionism and sanctions.

Now in its fourth edition, this best-selling reader in international political economy offers 31 solid articles - 15 new - by renowned scholars in political science and economics. Frieden and Lake have edited and introduced each reading with care to ensure its accessibility to students who are new to the subject. This reader continues to offer a provocative look at the postive and negative impacts of globalization.

Now in its fourth edition, this best-selling reader in international political economy offers 31 solid articles - 15 new - by renowned scholars in political science and economics. Frieden and Lake have edited and introduced each reading with care to ensure its accessibility to students who are new to the subject. This reader continues to offer a provocative look at the postive and negative impacts of globalization.

In Indirect Rule, David A. Lake examines how states indirectly exercise authority over others and how this mode of rule affects domestic and international politics. Indirect rule has long characterized interstate relationships and US foreign relations. A key mechanism of international hierarchy, indirect rule involves an allied group within a client state adopting policies preferred by a dominant state in exchange for the latter's support. Drawing on the history of US involvement in the Caribbean and Central America, Western Europe, and the Arab Middle East, Lake shows that indirect rule is more likely to occur when the specific assets at risk are large and governance costs are low. Lake's conceptualization of indirect rule sharpens our understanding of how the United States came to occupy the pinnacle of world power. Yet the consequences of indirect rule he documents—including anti-Americanism—reveal its shortcomings. As US efforts at democracy promotion and other forms of intervention abroad face declining support at home, Indirect Rule compels us to consider whether this method of rule ultimately advances American interests.

We rely on NGOs to monitor the ethical practices of governments and for-profit firms and to undertake many humanitarian tasks that public and private actors will not do. While we are critical of public and private sector failures, we do not reflect enough on the credibility of the NGOs which take their place. Can we be sure that products NGOs label as child-labor free are in fact so, that the coffee labeled as 'fair trade' is farmed in sustainable ways, or that the working conditions monitored by NGOs are safe and that the wages are reasonable? Can we know that humanitarian organizations are, in fact, using our donations to alleviate human suffering rather than pursuing other goals? This book explores the problems of establishing the credibility of NGO activities as they monitor working conditions, human rights and elections and provide finance through microcredit institutions, development aid and emergency assistance.

In Indirect Rule, David A. Lake examines how states indirectly exercise authority over others and how this mode of rule affects domestic and international politics. Indirect rule has long characterized interstate relationships and US foreign relations. A key mechanism of international hierarchy, indirect rule involves an allied group within a client state adopting policies preferred by a dominant state in exchange for the latter's support. Drawing on the history of US involvement in the Caribbean and Central America, Western Europe, and the Arab Middle East, Lake shows that indirect rule is more likely to occur when the specific assets at risk are large and governance costs are low. Lake's conceptualization of indirect rule sharpens our understanding of how the United States came to occupy the pinnacle of world power. Yet the consequences of indirect rule he documents—including anti-Americanism—reveal its shortcomings. As US efforts at democracy promotion and other forms of intervention abroad face declining support at home, Indirect Rule compels us to consider whether this method of rule ultimately advances American interests.

The most common image of world politics involves states negotiating, cooperating, or sometimes fighting with one another; billiard balls in motion on a global pool table. Yet working through local proxies or agents, through what Eli Berman and David A. Lake call a strategy of "indirect control," has always been a central tool of foreign policy. Understanding how countries motivate local allies to act in sometimes costly ways, and when and how that strategy succeeds, is essential to effective foreign policy in today's world. In this splendid collection, Berman and Lake apply a variant of principal-agent theory in which the alignment of interests or objectives between a powerful state and a local proxy is central. Through analysis of nine detailed cases, Proxy Wars finds that: when principals use rewards and punishments tailored to the agent's domestic politics, proxies typically comply with their wishes; when the threat to the principal or the costs to the agent increase, the principal responds with higher-powered incentives and the proxy responds with greater effort; if interests diverge too much, the principal must either take direct action or admit that indirect control is unworkable. Covering events from Denmark under the Nazis to the Korean War to contemporary Afghanistan, and much in between, the chapters in Proxy Wars engage many disciplines and will suit classes taught in political science, economics, international relations, security studies, and much more.

International relations are generally understood as a realm of anarchy in which countries lack any superior authority and interact within a Hobbesian state of nature. In Hierarchy in International Relations, David A. Lake challenges this traditional view, demonstrating that states exercise authority over one another in international hierarchies that vary historically but are still pervasive today.

Revisiting the concepts of authority and sovereignty, Lake offers a novel view of international relations in which states form social contracts that bind both dominant and subordinate members. The resulting hierarchies have significant effects on the foreign policies of states as well as patterns of international conflict and cooperation. Focusing largely on U.S.-led hierarchies in the contemporary world, Lake provides a compelling account of the origins, functions, and limits of political order in the modern international system. The book is a model of clarity in theory, research design, and the use of evidence.

Motivated by concerns about the declining international legitimacy of the United States following the Iraq War, Hierarchy in International Relations offers a powerful analytic perspective that has important implications for understanding America's position in the world in the years ahead.

We rely on NGOs to monitor the ethical practices of governments and for-profit firms and to undertake many humanitarian tasks that public and private actors will not do. While we are critical of public and private sector failures, we do not reflect enough on the credibility of the NGOs which take their place. Can we be sure that products NGOs label as child-labor free are in fact so, that the coffee labeled as 'fair trade' is farmed in sustainable ways, or that the working conditions monitored by NGOs are safe and that the wages are reasonable? Can we know that humanitarian organizations are, in fact, using our donations to alleviate human suffering rather than pursuing other goals? This book explores the problems of establishing the credibility of NGO activities as they monitor working conditions, human rights and elections and provide finance through microcredit institutions, development aid and emergency assistance.

The most common image of world politics involves states negotiating, cooperating, or sometimes fighting with one another; billiard balls in motion on a global pool table. Yet working through local proxies or agents, through what Eli Berman and David A. Lake call a strategy of "indirect control," has always been a central tool of foreign policy. Understanding how countries motivate local allies to act in sometimes costly ways, and when and how that strategy succeeds, is essential to effective foreign policy in today's world. In this splendid collection, Berman and Lake apply a variant of principal-agent theory in which the alignment of interests or objectives between a powerful state and a local proxy is central. Through analysis of nine detailed cases, Proxy Wars finds that: when principals use rewards and punishments tailored to the agent's domestic politics, proxies typically comply with their wishes; when the threat to the principal or the costs to the agent increase, the principal responds with higher-powered incentives and the proxy responds with greater effort; if interests diverge too much, the principal must either take direct action or admit that indirect control is unworkable. Covering events from Denmark under the Nazis to the Korean War to contemporary Afghanistan, and much in between, the chapters in Proxy Wars engage many disciplines and will suit classes taught in political science, economics, international relations, security studies, and much more.

The Great Recession and its aftershocks, including the Eurozone banking and debt crisis, add up to the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although economic explanations for the Great Recession have proliferated, the political causes and consequences of the crisis have received less systematic attention. Politics in the New Hard Times is the first book to focus on the Great Recession as a political crisis, one with both political sources and political consequences.

The authors examine variation in crises over time and across countries, rather than treating these events as undifferentiated shocks. Chapters also explore how crisis has forced the redefinition and reinforcement of interests at the level of individual attitudes and in national political coalitions. Throughout, the authors stress that the Great Recession is only the latest in a long history of international economic crises with significant political effects and that it is unlikely to be the last.

Contributors: Suzanne Berger, MIT; J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego; Peter Cowhey, University of California, San Diego; Peter A. Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego; Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego; Peter A. Hall, Harvard University; Miles Kahler, University of California, San Diego; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell University; Ikuo Kume, Waseda University; David A. Lake, University of California, San Diego; Megumi Naoi, University of California, San Diego; Stephen C. Nelson, Northwestern University; Pablo Pinto, Columbia University; James Shinn, Princeton University"

The strategic-choice approach has a long pedigree in international relations. In an area often rent by competing methodologies, editors David A. Lake and Robert Powell take the best of accepted and contested knowledge among many theories. With the contributors to this volume, they offer a unifying perspective, which begins with a simple insight: students of international relations want to explain the choices actors make--whether these actors be states, parties, ethnic groups, companies, leaders, or individuals.

This synthesis offers three new benefits: first, the strategic interaction of actors is the unit of analysis, rather than particular states or policies; second, these interactions are now usefully organized into analytic schemes, on which conceptual experiments may be based; and third, a set of methodological "bets" is then made about the most productive ways to analyze the interactions. Together, these elements allow the pragmatic application of theories that may apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as individuals protesting environmental degradation, governments seeking to control nuclear weapons, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for international peacekeeping. Besides the editors, the six contributors to this book, all distinguished scholars of international relations, are Jeffry A. Frieden, James D. Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, and Arthur A. Stein. Their work is an invaluable introduction for scholars and students of international relations, economists, and government decision-makers.

The wave of ethnic conflict that has recently swept across parts of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa has led many political observers to fear that these conflicts are contagious. Initial outbreaks in such places as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Rwanda, if not contained, appear capable of setting off epidemics of catastrophic proportions. In this volume, David Lake and Donald Rothchild have organized an ambitious, sophisticated exploration of both the origins and spread of ethnic conflict, one that will be useful to policymakers and theorists alike.

The editors and contributors argue that ethnic conflict is not caused directly by intergroup differences or centuries-old feuds and that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not simply uncork ethnic passions long suppressed. They look instead at how anxieties over security, competition for resources, breakdown in communication with the government, and the inability to make enduring commitments lead ethnic groups into conflict, and they consider the strategic interactions that underlie ethnic conflict and its effective management.

How, why, and when do ethnic conflicts either diffuse by precipitating similar conflicts elsewhere or escalate by bringing in outside parties? How can such transnational ethnic conflicts best be managed? Following an introduction by the editors, which lays a strong theoretical foundation for approaching these questions, Timur Kuran, Stuart Hill, Donald Rothchild, Colin Cameron, Will H. Moore, and David R. Davis examine the diffusion of ideas across national borders and ethnic alliances. Without disputing that conflict can spread, James D. Fearon, Stephen M. Saideman, Sandra Halperin, and Paula Garb argue that ethnic conflict today is primarily a local phenomenon and that it is breaking out in many places simultaneously for similar but largely independent reasons. Stephen D. Krasner, Daniel T. Froats, Cynthia S. Kaplan, Edmond J. Keller, Bruce W. Jentleson, and I. William Zartman focus on the management of transnational ethnic conflicts and emphasize the importance of domestic confidence-building measures, international intervention, and preventive diplomacy.

Critics of globalization claim that economic integration drains political authority from states: devolving authority to newly empowered regions, delegating it to supranational organizations, and transferring it to multinational firms and nongovernmental organizations. Globalization is also attacked for forcing convergence of state institutions and policies and threatening the ability of societies to chart their own democratically determined courses. In "Governance in a Global Economy," Miles Kahler and David Lake assemble the contributions of seventeen leading scholars who have systematically investigated how global economic integration produces changes of governance. These authors conclude that globalization has created a new and intricate fabric of governance, but one that fails to match the stark portrait of beleaguered states.

Exploring changes in governance across several policy areas (such as tourism, trade, finance, and fiscal and monetary policy), the authors demonstrate that globalization changes the policy preferences of some actors, increases the bargaining power of others, and opens new institutional options for yet others. By reintroducing agency and choice into our understanding of globalization, this book provides important new insights into the complex and contingent effects of globalization on political authority and governance.

The introduction and the conclusion are by the editors; the contributors are James A. Caporaso, Benjamin J. Cohen, Barry Eichengreen, Zachary Elkins, Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Gourevitch, Virginia Haufler, Michael J. Hiscox, Robert O. Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, Walter Mattli, Kathleen R. McNamara, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Jonathan Rodden, Ronald Rogowski, Beth A. Simmons, and Peter Van Houten.

Why do nations so frequently abandon unrestricted international commerce in favor of trade protectionism? David A. Lake contends that the dominant explanation, interest group theory, does not adequately explain American trade strategy or address the contradictory elements of cooperation and conflict that shape the international economy. Power, Protection, and Free Trade offers an alternative, systemic approach to trade strategy that builds on the interaction between domestic and international factors. In this innovative book, Lake maintains that both protection and free trade are legitimate and effective instruments of national policy, the considered responses of nations to varying international structures.

The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder's Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader's legitimacy at home.In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.

The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder’s Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader’s legitimacy at home. In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.

Throughout what publisher Henry Luce dubbed the "American century," the United States has wrestled with two central questions. Should it pursue its security unilaterally or in cooperation with others? If the latter, how can its interests be best protected against opportunism by untrustworthy partners? In a major attempt to explain security relations from an institutionalist approach, David A. Lake shows how the answers to these questions have differed after World War I, during the Cold War, and today. In the debate over whether to join the League of Nations, the United States reaffirmed its historic policy of unilateralism. After World War II, however, it broke decisively with tradition and embraced a new policy of cooperation with partners in Europe and Asia. Today, the United States is pursuing a new strategy of cooperation, forming ad hoc coalitions and evincing an unprecedented willingness to shape but then work within the prevailing international consensus on the appropriate goals and means of foreign policy.

In interpreting these three defining moments of American foreign policy, Lake draws on theories of relational contracting and poses a general theory of security relationships. He arrays the variety of possible security relationships on a continuum from anarchy to hierarchy, and explains actual relations as a function of three key variables: the benefits from pooling security resources and efforts with others, the expected costs of opportunistic behavior by partners, and governance costs. Lake systematically applies this theory to each of the "defining moments" of twentieth-century American foreign policy and develops its broader implications for the study of international relations.

The Great Recession and its aftershocks, including the Eurozone banking and debt crisis, add up to the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although economic explanations for the Great Recession have proliferated, the political causes and consequences of the crisis have received less systematic attention. Politics in the New Hard Times is the first book to focus on the Great Recession as a political crisis, one with both political sources and political consequences.

The authors examine variation in crises over time and across countries, rather than treating these events as undifferentiated shocks. Chapters also explore how crisis has forced the redefinition and reinforcement of interests at the level of individual attitudes and in national political coalitions. Throughout, the authors stress that the Great Recession is only the latest in a long history of international economic crises with significant political effects and that it is unlikely to be the last.

Contributors: Suzanne Berger, MIT; J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego; Peter Cowhey, University of California, San Diego; Peter A. Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego; Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego; Peter A. Hall, Harvard University; Miles Kahler, University of California, San Diego; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell University; Ikuo Kume, Waseda University; David A. Lake, University of California, San Diego; Megumi Naoi, University of California, San Diego; Stephen C. Nelson, Northwestern University; Pablo Pinto, Columbia University; James Shinn, Princeton University"

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Conflict among nations for forty-five years after World War II was dominated by the major bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War; states in differing legions of the world are taking their affairs more into their own hands and working out new arrangements for security that best suit their needs. This trend toward new "regional orders" is the subject of this book, which seeks both to document the emergence and strengthening of these new regional arrangements and to show how international relations theory needs to be modified to take adequate account of their salience in the world today.

Rather than treat international politics as everywhere the same, or each region as unique, this hook adopts a comparative approach. It recognizes that, while regions vary widely in their characteristics, comparative analysis requires a common typology and set of causal variables. It presents theories of regional order that both generalize about regions and predict different patterns of conflict and cooperation from their individual traits.

The editors conclude that, in the new world of regional orders, the quest for universal principles of foreign policy by great powers like the United States is chimerical and dangerous. Regional orders differ, and policy artist accommodate these differences if it is to succeed.

Contributors are Brian L. Job, Edmund J. Keller, Yuen Foong Khong, David A. Lake, Steven E. Lobell, David R. Mares, Patrick M. Nlotgan. Paul A. Papayoanou, David J. Pervin, Philip G. Roeder, Richard Rosecrance and Peter Schott, Susan Shirk, Etel Solingen, and Arthur A. Stein.

How has the U.S. government made the nation's foreign economic policy over the last hundred years? Social scientists have traditionally presented the American state as relatively weak, its policies as directly reflecting the domestic balance of strength among interested social groups and economic sectors. This collection of essays by seven notable young political scientists provides a theoretical reevaluation of the forces at work in national policy making and present evidence that the effectiveness of the national government in shaping U.S. policy has been greatly underestimated.